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ABSTRAK
Artikel ini bertujuan menjelaskan potensi pembagian kekuasaan ( power-sharing )
sebagai kunci utama dalam konflik etnis, khususnya di negara-negara berkembang.
Adapun skema pembagian kekuasaan ini sebenarnya menawarkan mengenai adanya
solusi positif yang seimbang dan setara antara aktor negara dengan kelompok separatis dalam memutus konflik dan kemudian beralih menginisiasi adanya perdamaian
di level akar rumput. Dengan menggunakan analisa kuantitatif melalui analisis dataset
yang dikembangkan oleh Power Sharing Event Dataset (PSED) and Implementation
of Pacts Dataset (IMPACT), artikel ini menunjukkan dua termuan penting. Pertama,
skema contoh pembagian kekuasaan yang menjanjikan adalah pembagian wilayah
utamanya lewat pemekaran daerah dan pembagian kewenangan politik antara aktor
negara dengan kelompok-kelompok separatis. Temuan kedua adalah pembicaraan
negosiasi pembagian kekuasaan yang ideal sebelumnya antara para aktor negara dengan kelompok separatis menjadi relevan dalam nantinya menghasilkan kesepakatan
pembagian kekuasaan yang terikat hukum antara aktor pemerintah dengan aktor separatis. Konklusi dari studi ini adalah kapasitas negara menjadi faktor penting dalam
mengelola konflik. Kapasitas negara yang kuat akan mampu untuk mengelola konflik
sedangkan kapasitas negara yang lemah malah justru memperburuk konflik tersebut.
Kata kunci: pembagian kekuasaan, pembagian kewenangan, pembagian/pemekaran
wilayah, kapasitas negara
ABSTRACT
This article explains how power-sharing could determine conflict resolution in developing states, particularly in developing countries. This scheme offers a win-win solution
between state actors and the separatist movements to curb conflict and initiate peace-building at the grassroots level. Using a quantitative analysis that employed datasets from Power-Sharing Event Dataset (PSED) and Implementation of Pacts Dataset
(IMPACT), this article notably reveals two important findings. First, the most promising
power-sharing schemes are territorial and political power-sharing. Furthermore, the
preliminary talk about ideal power-sharing consensus between the state actors and
rebel groups is important to determine the outcome of power-sharing policies. Finally,
this article concludes that the state capacity shows the final conflict resolution. Strong
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states can manage ethnic conflict, while weak state capacity could exacerbate the
ethnic conflict.
Keywords: power-sharing, political power-sharing, territorial reform/territorial sharing,
state capacity

I N T RODUC T ION

Power-sharing is a crucial factor in managing harmonious relationships
in divided societies. Unfortunately, conflict occasionally occurs due to
unbalanced representatives at the state level. Therefore, power-sharing
is the primary strategy to keep conditions of peace in society. However,
it is important to note that the government implements power-sharing
differently in the real world, especially when dealing with diverse ethnic
groups.
There is an ongoing debate over the result of how power-sharing has
been promoted in minimizing ethnic conflict in democratic countries.
Chandra argued that power-sharing could be fulfilled if it applies to
the patronage democracy (Chandra 2004). Furthermore, ethnicity is
the possible point where rebel actors-turned-local politicians will direct
their patronage in the context of restrained information. His argument
means that political power-sharing would be the ideal conflict resolution because it enables the separatists to be leading actors in managing
their region. Like Chandra, Lijphart also believes that political powersharing is an ideal solution to resolve the conflict by offering proportional council seats and veto rights (Lijphart 2002, 2004). To sum up,
political power-sharing incorporates the former rebel groups within the
state system by appointing them as the official regional leaders.
In contrast to the previous argument, Huber argued that economic
power-sharing would be relevant in shaping peace and conflict resolution (Huber 2017). Moreover, his argument emphasizes that when the
number of poor people who belong to the majority ethnic group increases, it will lead to ethnic conflict at the grass-root level. These poor
people often become separatists when fed up with economic inequality
between the central and provincial governments. Similar to Huber,
Horowitz adds on the notion that power-sharing has been powerless
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to resolve the conflict due to political deadlock agreement if it is not
followed up by mutual and balanced economic concessions between
the minority and the majority (Horowitz 2014). In summary, economic
power-sharing maintains the status quo of majoritarian ethnicity domination in accessing economic sources while allowing minorities to do
so.
Regarding the debates mentioned earlier, the existing power-sharing
works of literature seem to be pragmatic when it comes to conflict resolution. Furthermore, underlying country conditions like post-colonial
situations should be a big picture of power-sharing policies. This paper
would like to investigate the relationship between power-sharing and
managing ethnic conflict with nation-state-building in the post-colonial context. This situation brings us up to the unsettled subnational
problems that may cause conflict after the colonialism period. This
paper also tries to discover different power-sharing policies that solve
ethnic conflicts in developing countries. More specifically, this paper
examines the effectiveness level of power-sharing in reducing conflict
escalation. Both political power-sharing and economic power-sharing
policies surely have positive and negative implications toward peacebuilding at the grass-root level.
The research question in this paper is “how does the possibility of
power-sharing resolve secessionist ethnic conflicts in several developing
democratic countries?”. This question addresses two critical issues here
that are conditional political agreements between contested actors and
government and the suitable conditions for power-sharing policy. The
striking point I make here is that it does not matter whether economic
or political power-sharing might be relevant in easing down the heightened conflict tension; it backs again to the state capacity to manage
ethnic conflict.
The structure of this paper will be as follows: the next section introduces the literature on power-sharing and ethnic conflict as the theoretical point and develops two main expectations. First, the stronger
the separatist movement at the subnational level, the less reasonable
power-sharing measures will resolve the conflict. Second, the more
Published by UI Scholars Hub, 2022
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mutual concession between government and separatist movement at
the subnational level, the more reasonable power-sharing measures
will resolve the conflict. Moving on, this study narrows the literature
reviews down to theoretical frameworks and several hypotheses. The
last part of this study finally elaborates the findings and tables into the
discussion section.
L I T ER AT U R E R E V I E W

The Concept of Power-Sharing in Politics
Power-sharing is a unique theory because it relates to the geographical
condition instead of theoretical analysis. It also has a different solution
for peace and conflict resolutions. Both conditions, therefore, make the
study of power-sharing apply to the area studies rather than conceptual
analysis. Moreover, the different outcomes of power-sharing in different
countries are sometimes mixed. These latter obstacles will be an academic challenge for scholars to scrutinize something beyond previous
and existing power-sharing policies.
Something beyond power-sharing policies perhaps is a state capacity.
This refers to how the state shows its authority enforcement over citizens. In line with the power-sharing, the example of state capacity can
be 1) military capacity, 2) bureaucratic or administrative capacity, and 3)
political institution capacity. These three categories represent the ability
of the state to deter and monitor rebel groups to bring them into the
peace negotiation process (Hendrix 2010, 274–75). These three categories likely determine the power-sharing proposal between government
and rebel groups. If the state can overcome the rebel with strong military action, it will have no power-sharing scheme. On second thought,
if the state has less military action and is committed to the negotiation
with administrative assistance, it will have territorial power-sharing or
economic power-sharing between government and rebel groups. This
second possibility is similar to the third one who believes that if the state
capacity has a good and reputable political institution capacity, it will
result in political-power sharing, particularly territorial reform. These
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three possibilities surely depend on the conflict situation per country.
More specifically, the conflict duration and the belligerents involved in
the conflict will likely determine the power-sharing model.
Previous research on power-sharing studies primarily focuses on
three scopes, such as in-country case, inter-countries case, and postconflict period. These three areas give an idea of how conflict duration affects social relationships and peace negotiation during and
after the conflict. They also have different methods and findings. The
existing power-sharing studies should intertwine with ethnic conflict
and peace-building policies in this study. Since majoritarian states and
marginalized minorities make up the largest ethnic conflict in most
developing democratic countries, the power-sharing policies should
require peace-building initiatives. This kind of initiative can equal political representation and fairly economic distribution. Both policies
need a strong state capacity to nurture and maintain peace-building at
the subnational level. Here I examined a diverse range of readings to
determine the factors shaping successful stories and why power-sharing
failed to mitigate conflict.
Lebanon and Sri Lanka have a challenging situation in implementing the power-sharing resolutions from the in-country case. Both
countries are also experiencing divided society with huge religion
and ethnicity segregation. In the Lebanese case, the government has
implemented power-sharing since 1990, soon after the civil war. The
Lebanese power-sharing briefly appoints a Maronite Christian to be
a President, a Shia Muslim to be a Speaker of the Parliament, and
a Sunni Muslim to be a Prime Minister (Baytiyeh 2019). Although
these political appointments ideally should be a good example of powersharing, in reality, the situation does not support that ideal solution
because high sectarian power-sharing causes political deadlocks at the
elite level (Fakhoury 2019, 11). This condition leads to discord in the
parliamentary and presidential rule. The religion-led parties contribute
to the political blocks to access state resources (Fakhoury 2019, 14). The
three political powerhouses (Sunni, Shia, and Christian) align with
international actors such as Arab Saudi, Iran, and Western power. This
Published by UI Scholars Hub, 2022
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foreign involvement notably shows the proxy wars between three main
political blocks, particularly in the Arab world. For the sake of Lebanese
power-sharing, this external affiliation eventually guarantees there are
no dominant actors in the political arena. Another purpose is ensuring
no one single foreign bloc could interfere domestically with Lebanese
politics and government system. However, these three strained political
blocks do not bear the public responsibility (Fakhoury 2019, 19). In this
sense, elites mobilize the religious sentiments to preserve their positions
and make the intra-political sects in a stalemate.
Conversely, Sri Lankan’s power-sharing case shows different arguments. While Lebanon shows power-sharing in strained political blocks,
how Sri Lanka performed power-sharing has failed due to strong ethnocentric feeling (Kelegama 2015, 239). There was a strong hostile view
from the Sinhalese ethnic groups and opposition parties to challenge
Tamil’s political devolution proposal (Kelegama 2015, 242). The main
source of ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka was linguistic nationalism, particularly the Sinhalese language, and institutional decay (DeVotta 2005,
143). These two factors eventually led to the Tamil mobilization, a
rebel group, namely Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The
foreign interventions from Norway and India could not resolve the conflict because the central government and rebel groups do not share
bilateral trust-building. The opposing view between government and
LTTE shows institutional decay, which means weak political institutions causes a state’s rule-making to become impartial and unconstitutional when facing rebel groups (DeVotta 2005, 152). This action,
consequently, makes no power-sharing work in the Sri Lankan case.
Instead, the strong military capacity from the central government relinquished the rebel group.
From both in-country cases, the probabilistic factors determining political sharing are the interplay between elites and its influence on the
public and the extent to which political sharing scheme proposals can
affect the dissidents. More specifically, this interplay also means that
the power-sharing scenario should be acceptable between the government and separatists. If both actors worked together to propose an ideal
https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/politik/vol7/iss2/16
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power-sharing, it would have balanced power-sharing. Conversely, if
the government and rebel groups insist on proposing their plan without
prior discussions, it will result in long-term disputes without resolution.
Compared with Asian experiences that showed turbulent and even
deadlock power-sharing, European counterparts told a different story
to us. One main point here is democracy in Europe, mostly in stable
condition. This factor, therefore, affects balanced and widespread democratic understandings for those European countries. In his research,
Schneckener compares six European countries, including Belgium,
Northern Ireland, South Tyrol, and Bosnia to understand the success
and failure stories about power-sharing implementation (Schneckener
2002, 211). These four regions represent the several multiethnic European countries that suffered from either ethnic conflict or identity disputes. These post-conflict periods surely bring a challenging situation to
propose an ideal power-sharing policy. He splits the determinant factors
into two groups: actor-oriented and structure-oriented. The former includes the elite’s behaviors and relationship with the public, while the
latter explains the territorial, social, and economic factors. Belgium and
South Tyrol generally show successes, whereas Bosnia and Northern
Ireland show failures. The successful or failed story here goes back to
how the state and its dissident maturely negotiate and make perpetual
power-sharing deals.
The important factors why Belgian and South Tyrol’s success story
are how they share economic development between different language
speakers and not declare the state itself as the monocultural state (DeVotta 2005, 143). This economic power-sharing can come true because
Belgium and the Italian government have enormous economic sources
to tame dissidents. This decision has a mutual impact on nation-building development, especially between central and provincial governments. After the economic matters finished, they began to talk about
mutual political concessions. This strategy is often popular, especially when the rebel group or dissidents agree to accept the economic
consensus. In this sense, having a common ground in the economy
firstly will lead to power-sharing by implementing linguistic pluralism
Published by UI Scholars Hub, 2022
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(Schneckener 2002, 218). These lesson-learned values would be a best
practice, particularly for those governments that want to curb conflict
without harming many innocent people.
Unlike Belgium and Tyrol, Bosnia, Cyprus, and Northern Ireland
have politicized issues that lead to ingrained violence. People do not
have a shared national identity in every three countries (Schneckener
2002, 214). There was no mutual agreement to negotiate because the
government and rebel group acted selfishly rather than diplomatically
working together. Both government and rebel groups still maintain
their hereditary identities instead. For example, Turkish and Hellenic
communities have their own governments instead of making a unitary
government.
Another example is a Serbian community with its republic within
Bosnia territory. These fragile conditions certainly make national instability in some respects. In this regard, elite behavior has been detrimental in implementing power-sharing.
In a nutshell, this literature would like to contribute to how the power-sharing concept can contribute to academic approaches to conflict
studies. From the previously-mentioned country cases, we can draw out
some typologies here. For example, in the in-country case, the proposal
of power-sharing policies to curb conflict might be fairly economic
distributions. The principle of state neutrality should be addressed to
ensure all belligerents willingly put down their weapons. Meanwhile,
for the inter-country, the proposal of power-sharing policies should
be strengthening state capacity. Since the conflict involves a group of
outsiders joining in domestic affairs, a strong state is indispensable to
deal with the foreign ethnic forces. The power-sharing proposal might
have a strong bureaucratic capacity for the post-conflict situation. The
inadequate public services might be behind the conflict. It should be
done with a similar ethnic composition within the bureaucracy system.
Another power-sharing can be consociationalism that enables all the
ethic representatives to have a public office position. These typologies
can contribute to the ongoing academic debates, whether economic or
political power-sharing. They will help us understand power-sharing
https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/politik/vol7/iss2/16
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in real-life conditions. Most importantly, they will help us know the
power-sharing and its connection with state strategies to resolve secessionist conflict.
M ET HODS

Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses
The key idea of the power-sharing concept is the participation of all
representatives in the decision-making process (Lijphart 2004, 97).
This concept also means no majoritarian groups make a public decision without consent from other groups. Lijphart is one of political
scholars in power-sharing studies. He describes three ideal types of
power-sharing in a democratic system such as the consociationalism
democracy, consensus democracy, and proportional democracy (Lijphart 2002, 108). The first idea refers to the political agreement among
diverse society members to establish a democratic government with fair
representatives’ composition (Lijphart 2004, 98–99). The second idea
is that mutual political accommodation comprises proportional election and a coalition government, and also checks on executive power
(McGann and Latner 2012, 825). The third idea is the guaranteed
representation for particular minorities in the parliament (Lijphart
2004, 100). In general, these three-democracy models in the powersharing concept focus on two basic operational factors: representation
and political autonomy. Both components subsequently determine the
result of power-sharing implementation at the subnational level. Following Lijphart’s ideas, having a peace agreement beforehand is the
key to proposing power-sharing schemes for the separatist movement
at the subnational level.
In summary, this first theoretical framework emphasizes equal and
fairly political power-sharing to curb separatism. It suggests that territorial reform or public office appointments accommodating separatists or
dissidents can be a good example of political power-sharing.
A divided society with high-intensity conflict is the primary concern
in Asian and African countries at the subnational level. Although, the
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power-sharing concept ideally can make a win-win solution between
the central government and the challengers. In reality, the result does
not follow the ideal pattern. Horowitz argues power-sharing sometimes
is not workable if ascriptive cleavages are highly concentrated in politics
(Horowitz 2014, 7). In this context, the primordial factors, such as different ethnic groups, religions, and languages, are the main conflict
sources. Since the beginning, the challengers have refused to talk with
the central government because of different political identities resulting
in power-sharing being less likely to reduce conflict. Another critic
considers unaccommodated political interests from the challengers.
Therefore, there are no preliminary talks between the government and
the rebel groups to reduce the conflict. This argument means the elite
hegemonic order constraints itself to talk with the challengers because it
will harm the national stability (Kelegama 2015, 238–39). This opposing
view reflects strong state unity rather than accommodating the challenger’s interests. At the same time, the challengers are disappointed
with the government’s stance. As a result, there is little hope for the
power-sharing agreement at the grassroots level.
All in all, this second theoretical framework suggests the need to
maintain the status quo at the subnational level through territorial reform. It will give authority for the locals to manage their home province
before going to political sharing with the central governments. Most
importantly, the sense of belongings over their home regions can bridge
the unsettled political power-sharing between separatists and the central governments.
In line with the aforementioned frameworks, political power-sharing
can work out if it involves balanced territorial reform. By contrast, halfhearted state capacity to reform the territory can result in the weak
political power-sharing for the separatists. Therefore, I hypothesize:
Hypothesis 1 (HI): the weaker governmental capacity to issue equal
political and territorial sharing for the separatists, the less likely the
power-sharing can curb the secessionist conflict.
The key definition of ethnic conflict is the violence conducted by
an ethnic group to another, by a group on an individual, by the state on
https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/politik/vol7/iss2/16
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a group, or by a group to the state (Ashutosh 2009). This broad definition means conflict usually involves two contested parties. I confine
myself to the definition, “Ethnic conflict is the conflict perpetrated by
the state on a group and vice versa,” for this research’s sake. This definition will guide me to understand the dynamic relationship between
state and separatist movements in power-sharing. This dynamic relation, more importantly, is how the conflict shifts from the battlefield
to the negotiating table. Most conflict cases worldwide have a series
of negotiations that aim to reduce greater conflict. The results often
succeed or fail. These binary results show the elite’s characteristics and
political concession talks.
According to the ethnic conflict, three models explain the relationship between the government’s elites and the separatist’s elites. They
are instrumentalism, constructivism, and institutionalism. Those three
models show how elites use ethnicity as political bargaining to obtain
mutual political concessions.
First, Instrumentalists argue that ethnicity is the main source of the
pursuit of economic and political interests. The elites often manipulate
ethnicity to extract the resources from the state (Ashutosh 2009). In
addition, instrumentalists believe conflict is also a product of rational
thinking among contested parties (Williams 2015, 148). This means
having common ground about mutual political concession will resolve
the conflict.
Second, constructivists argue that each society community has a
historical cleavage because of different identity factors such as religions
and languages. This argument means that ethnic conflict is inevitable
in a divided society because it relates to inherent origins. In this sense,
this approach does not explain enough about the power-sharing potency.
Third, institutionalists propose institutionalized power-sharing to
resolve conflicts such as federalism, proportional representation election system, and vote rights for minorities. This approach is similar to
Lipjhart’s theory about power-sharing. Following his theory, institutionalists have conflict resolutions through two dimensions. First, the execPublished by UI Scholars Hub, 2022
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utive-parties dimension comprises multi-party coalition, proportional
election, and diverse society corporatism. Second, the federal-unitary
dimension comprises bicameralism, judicial review, and federalism
(McGann and Latner 2012, 825).
In summary, institutionalism and instrumentalism give more definitive power-sharing solutions than the constructivism approach. The
institutionalists rely on how mutual trust-building can determine political negotiations among elites. The instrumentalists count on political
agreements accepted by parties. Both approaches eventually agree that
more concession will strengthen the power-sharing in resolving ethnic
conflict. In line with both views, I expect strong peace commitment
from government and rebel groups will impact more political concessions at the subnational level. Therefore, I hypothesize:
Hypothesis 2 (H2): the more mutual concession between government and separatist movement at the subnational level, the more reasonable power-sharing measures will resolve the conflict.

Datasets
In this research, I use two main datasets from Power-Sharing Event
Dataset (PSED) and Implementation of Pacts Dataset (IMPACT) to
measure the effect of power-sharing on ethnic conflict resolutions. The
former dataset was released by the GIGA (German Institute of Global
and Area Studies) in 2014. This data contains promise and practice
between the government and rebel groups in 41 surveyed countries
(Ottmann and Vullers 2014, 2). I employ this data to compare the ideal
and the practical type of power-sharing implementation.
PSED dataset defines power-sharing as the peace agreement between government and separatist (Ottmann and Vullers 2014, 2–4).
This definition enables me to figure out how power-sharing can resolve the conflict. However, the questions’ answers should be probabilistic because both datasets also have limitations. This dataset only
views power-sharing as the end product of power-sharing. Therefore,
we do not know the dynamic process between the government and
rebel groups. Another limitation is that datasets contain the empirical
https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/politik/vol7/iss2/16
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findings from five and seven years ago. It means the dataset could not
reflect the current power-sharing conditions. Therefore, we need to
explain qualitatively, especially some exceptional power-sharing cases
in some countries.

Data Explorations
I begin to extract information about the promise and practice of powersharing policies from the PSED dataset. This dataset captured the information from 1986 to 2006. I pick up some countries that represent
each continent. Interestingly, there is no American countries case in
this dataset. Oceania region just contributes Papua New Guinea (PNG)
dispute between the central government and Bougainville Islanders. I
choose to abandon it because the PNG does not represent the Oceania
case entirely. The countries I choose are those multiethnic nations with
strong secessionist movements. After that, I try to compare the promise
and the practice of power-sharing. Also, I want to analyze the probabilistic and determinant factors that determine the power-sharing results.
PSED dataset has two data observation parts. The first is the promised power-sharing proposal, and the second is the practical powersharing agreement. The former data consists of mostly binary data,
while the latter comprises mixed data (binary and categorical data).
I divide three power-sharing schemes: political power-sharing, economic power-sharing, and territorial power-sharing. These three policies
arguably show the political bargaining mechanism between government
and rebel groups to solve the ethnic conflict. I expect the stronger the
separatist movement are, the more likely they want to make an independence referendum in the future. In other words, political power-sharing
is the most preferred peace agreement agenda between government
and rebel groups. However, my hypothesis could be wrong in practice
because the ethnic rebel groups eventually accept self-governing rights
in territorial and economic matters. The two tables below are my empirical analyses from the dataset.
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Table 1: Promised Power-Sharing Agreement between
Government and Separatist Movement

Serbian Govt

Bosnia

Bosnian Govt

UCK

Sudan

Sudan Govt

SELMA

Congolese
Govt
Rwandan
Govt

Cocoyes

Rwanda

RPF

Afghanistan

Afghanistan
Govt

Hizb-i
Wahdat

India

Indian
Government
Indonesian
Govt
Philippines
Govt

ABSU

Indonesia
The
Philippines

GAM
MNLF

Referendum

Devolution

State
Companies

Fair Revenue

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Autonomy

No

Republika
Yes
Srpska
Croatian Govt Republic of
No
Krajina

Congo

Territorial
Power-Sharing

Parliament
seats

Serbia

Croatia

Rebel Group

Government

Country
name

Economic
PowerSharing

Ministerial
seats

Political
PowerSharing

Belligerents

Source: elaborated from statistical data.

DISCUSSION

Political and Ter ritorial Power-Sharing
as the Key of Conf lict Resolution
The table, as mentioned earlier, shows government and rebel groups
as two conflicted actors. In addition, three power-sharing provide policies proposal. There are ten multiethnic countries as the surveyed
countries case. All the data is binary. This enables us to understand
the probabilistic power-sharing factor in reducing conflict escalation.
The probabilistic explanations could be much likely, more likely, or
least likely arguments.
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From Table 1, the most promised power-sharing agreement strongly
emphasizes political and territorial power-sharing. Economic powersharing is the least favourable option for the central government. This
preliminary finding is in line with hypothesis 1: the stronger separatist
movement is giving a dilemmatic power-sharing position for the government. Both preferred power-sharing proposals above show the stronger
separatist tendencies at the subnational level. At the same time, national
unity is the central government’s priority to save the country. This condition gives an impression that power-sharing is less likely to finish the
ethnic conflict. A referendum is the least option if power-sharing is
failed at the subnational level. That is the most unpopular decision for
all those surveyed countries.
Serbia and Bosnia implemented a balanced power-sharing policy
regarding political and territorial matters from the European case. Bosnia proposes national power positions and autonomous region status for
Serb ethnic groups, whereas Serbia only offers the autonomous region
status for the Kosovan people. The Croatian case is exceptional because this country does not propose anything for the rebel groups. In
summary, proposed power-sharing shows that territorial power-sharing
and proportional democracy are much likely to solve an ethnic conflict.
From the African case, Sudan is the most advanced state, which
proposes all power-sharing policies to solve the long conflict with southern rebel groups. However, Sudan also provides a referendum option
for the rebel group. This means the strong separatist elites have better
bargaining politics than the central government. This indicates that
separatist groups gain a grass-root level; thereby, they can corner the
government. Rwanda’s case follows the European model that does
not offer economic power-sharing for the Tutsi rebel groups. Nevertheless, the Hutu-led government proposes greater political and territorial
concessions for Tutsi. In summary, proposed power-sharing is failed to
propose consensus democracy due to strong elite behavior.
From the Asian case, three countries offer territorial power-sharing
for the rebel groups. Afghanistan case is an exception here because
it only offers ministerial positions. National stability is the main foPublished by UI Scholars Hub, 2022
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cus for India, Indonesia, and the Philippines as they lie on regional
autonomy over political power-sharing. Although, Indonesia and the
Philippines are adopting a unitary state system. Both countries are
likely to implement federal ways to solve the conflict by agreeing on
more self-governing rights for rebel groups. In this context, GAM and
MNLF people have successfully constructed themselves to rebel on behalf entire Acehnese and Moro people. This is the instrumental ethnic
conflict. Both rebel groups also represented two charismatic leading
figures: Hasan Di Tiro and Nur Misuari.
For the Acehnese case, Hasan Di Tiro casts himself as a reborn and
independent Aceh (Reid 2004, 307). His self-appointed declaration as
the Acehnese patron assumes full responsibility for the recreation of
Acehnese historical consciousness. To make it convincing, he reveals
his blood lineage with Tengku Cik Di Tiro—a highly respected ulama
who led a rebellion against the Dutch colonial government—and with
Daud Beureu’eh—former Darul Islam leader in Aceh (Aspinall 2007,
252-253). As a result, Tiro successfully builds a charismatic persona
to raise Acehnese nationalism through the “Gerakan Aceh Merdeka”
(GAM) or Free Aceh Movement. In this regard, this kind of nationalism wants to rebuild glorified Aceh as an Islamic sovereign state,
albeit Acehnese nationalism is more secular than Islamic sense (Aspinall 2007, 251). As a result, Aceh ethnic conflict is resolved, and many
former GAM officers run a public office at the regency and provincial
levels.
For Moro case, Nur Misuari of Bangsamoro does not have strong
personal histories like Hasan di Tiro does. However, he uses past histories to lift Bangsamoro nationalism instead—the basic ethnic conflict
problem in Mindanao Island (Engineer 1984, 2155). Maguindanao Sultanate of Mindanao has fought to defend their land over three centuries
against Spanish colonial rule (Engineer 1984, 2155). This historical
fact gives strong shreds of evidence that Moro was an independent state
before forcible accession to the Philippines. Nur Misuari later combines
the glorified histories and the current marginalization and insecurity
under Manila to establish Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)
https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/politik/vol7/iss2/16
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(Bertrand 2000, 44). MNLF is responsible for returning the lost lands
to the Moro people, protecting a Muslim way of life, and preventing
Christian immigrations (Bertrand 2000, 44). These ethnic demands
eventually brought Nur Misuari to power as the MNLF leader and
governor of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)
from 1996 to 2001. In the end, Mindanao ethnic conflict was still negotiating (Aurellio 2019).
These two-rebel groups represented homogeneous ethnic separatists who have a better bargaining political logic than government. The
strong bargaining politics shows two manifestos that strongly show ethnic consciousness. Brown argues that this kind of consciousness encourages the elites to strengthen their authority and support through primordial sentiments (1988, 67). The rise of primordial sentiments can be
successful due to long-term grievances against the central government.
The source of grievances is mainly as economic disparities between
locals and central government, but then it escalates into ethnic conflict
war. These sentiments also mainly included a sense of vulnerability
towards state penetration in their territories. This situation eventually
installed elites to act as spokesmen and leaders of their communities
(Brown 1988, 68). Another explanation about ethnic consciousness is
the different ethnic histories between the national and local states. Rajah believes the state’s origin depends on the myths from their ancestors
(2002, 522). Therefore, rebel elites use those arguments to make bold
arguments about a separate nation.
As a result, giving territorial power-sharing and self-governing rights
are likely to reduce ethnic conflict potency for Aceh and Bangsamoro.
Moreover, while Indonesia does not agree with a referendum in the
power-sharing agreement, the Philippines offers a referendum for the
Moro people. In summary, the Asian case is less likely to accommodate
rebel groups at the national political level. Instead, it seems like territorial power-sharing is the government’s way to localize the separatist
movement by giving more self-governing rights.
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Table 2: Realisation of Power-Sharing Agreement between
Government and Separatist Movement
Belligerents

Pre-Perpetual Power
Sharing Period

Government

Rebel
Group

More than
one Rebel
Groups

The
realization
of PowerSharing
Policies

Serbia

Serbian Govt

UCK

Previous
Talks
Before
Signed
Power
Sharing

Post- Perpetual PowerSharing Agreements

No

No

Agreed

Bosnia

Bosnian Govt

No

Agreed

Croatia

Croatian Govt

Republika
No
Srpska
Republic of
No
Krajina

No

Agreed

Sudan

Sudan Govt

Congo

Congolese Govt Cocoyes

Rwanda

Rwandan Govt

Country name

Afghanistan

SELMA

No

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

RPF

Afghanistan
Govt

Hizb-i
Wahdat

India

Indian
Government

ABSU

Indonesia

Indonesian Govt GAM

The Philippines

Philippines Govt MNLF

Descriptive
Explanations

New
Autonomous
Status Enacted
Federal Status is
Given
Territorial
power-sharing

Political powersharing and
Referendum
Military
Agreed
Integration
Peace
agreement
In-between signature
Civil conflict
recurrence
Agreed

Yes

No

Agreed

No

No

Agreed

No

Yes

Agreed

No

Yes

Agreed

Political
Power Sharing
between
Rabbani and
Hekmatyar
Peace
agreement
signature
Territorial
power-sharing
Territorial
power-sharing

Source: elaborated from statistical data.

The Final Results of Power-Sharing schemes
in Several Democratic Countries
Compared with Table 1, Table 2 show the different structure. This
table is not only providing binary data but also categorical data with
a qualitative explanation. The binary data indicates the prior process
and the final peace agreement results, where the categorial explains
the empirical power-sharing outcomes. This analysis emphasizes the
determinant factors.
https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/politik/vol7/iss2/16
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Table 2 shows varied results in practical power-sharing after signing
the peace agreement between governments and rebel groups. European
and Asian countries’ results are still consistent with previously promised power-sharing, while African countries remain turbulent. Based on
Table 2, political and territorial power-sharing shows that power-sharing
policies have successfully resolved the ethnic conflict. Both also sign
more mutual concessions between government and rebel groups, especially proportional seats in political representation.
From the European case, territorial power-sharing is preferable to
political power-sharing in the practical power-sharing policy. These
three Balkan countries agree to give autonomous status to reduce further conflict escalation. Shared political seats and devolved government
are the determinant power-sharing factors from the European case.
The African case showcases a series of preliminary discussions that
has determined the final power-sharing results. As expected, stronger
separatist southern Sudan groups corner the Sudan government in the
stalemate condition. This result follows hypothesis 1, but it does not
connect with hypothesis 2 because Southern rebel groups have stronger
independence than the central government’s control. Unlike Sudan,
Rwanda’s ethnic conflict remains turbulent. This condition certainly
follows hypothesis 1 but not hypothesis 2. In short, the African case
shows stronger ethnic resentments because power-sharing does not
make it feasible to solve the conflict. Moreover, power-sharing leads to
more complicated situations. The ingrained ethnic resentment is the
determinant factor why power sharing is failed.
From the Asian case, political and territorial power-sharing is significant to resolve ethnic conflict in Afghanistan, the Philippines, and Indonesia. The Indian case is unclear because the result does not provide
a technical explanation. A shared ministerial position is a key to solving
a conflict between two major ethnic groups in Afghanistan. Devolved
government form is significant to resolve conflict in the Philippines and
Indonesia. These different approaches show that geographical condition is likely to determine the final power-sharing results. Because both
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southeast Asian countries are island countries, it is reasonable to give
more self-governing rights for the rebel groups to manage their regions.

Comparative Discussion about Power-Sharing and
Its Implication toward Conf lict Resolution
Both above-mentioned empirical analyses largely support my hypotheses. From the proposed power-sharing findings, the stronger separatist movements are, the less likely power-sharing to resolve the ethnic
conflict. That is my first hypothesis. African and Asian countries seem
to follow this pattern. However, Asian countries successfully reduce
the stronger separatist movement by implementing territorial powersharing and consensus democracy at the subnational level. This finding
follows the second hypothesis. It is likely that territorial power-sharing
also brings mutual concessions to the separatist elites and their peoples.
Implementing the power-sharing policy is much likely following
the democracy model from Lijphart. Serbia and Bosnia implement
proportional democracy and territorial power-sharing to the Kosovar
rebels and Serbs in Srpska. This also shows the stronger homogeneous
ethnic rebel groups in Serbia and Bosnia. However, the practical powersharing shows different results from the promised plan. While Serbs
rebels accepted the devolved government from the Bosnia government,
the Kosovar people chose to take the independence option from Serbia.
The failure of power-sharing resolution in the African case shows
that the weak state capacity exacerbates the ethnic conflict at the subnational level. The rebel elites use the instrumentalism ethnic approach
to persuade their people to rebel against the state continuously. This
approach includes using ethnicity closeness to increase local resentment
toward the central government. While weak state capacity is the strong
factor why power-sharing failed in Africa, the Asian case shows the
geographical conditions are the significant power-sharing policy. Adopting the federalism principle in designing regional autonomy resolves
the ethnic conflict between Aceh and Mindanao. It seems Indonesia
and India follow Lijphart’s theory about consensus democracy at the
subnational level.
https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/politik/vol7/iss2/16
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The discussions above draw out the typologies between the powersharing strategies model and separatist conflict resolutions. I summarise
it in Table 3 below here.
Table 3: The Typologies of Ideal Power-Sharing to Curb Secessionist Movement
No

Power Sharing
Strategies
Public
Appointments

Conflict
Situations
Post Conflict

2

Territorial
Reforms

In-Conflict

3

Balanced
Economic
Redistributions

Pre-Conflict

1

Government

Separatists

Ideal Secessionist
Conflict Resolutions
The government may The separatists
Special autonomous
appoint the leading
should relinquish
region status/
secessionist figure to
their secessions
Representative
set up several local
agenda once they
bureaucracy system/
office offices
are appointed to be Consociationalism
head of regions.
government
Territorial reform
Administrating their Federalism
is meant to localize
territory enables the system/Devolved
ethical conflict within a former separatists
administration
devolved system.
to establish their
own home rules that
might differ from
national rules.
Greater access for
Fiscal
Allocating 50:50
locals to utilize
Decentralisation/
public fund transfer
Special Rights
to provincial
the common
for the provincial
governments
goods, which were
government to
promised by the
propose a tax on its
government
natural resources.

Source: data elaborated on my own

Based on Table 3, the three strategies hail from political and economic
power-sharing policies. Generally, there is no ideal solution to curb
separatism because it depends on the context. For example, political
power-sharing might be the strong policy to curb secessionist movements through peace agreements. This has an aim for maintaining
stability at the subnational level. This also means the government is
willing to give mutual concessions to keep national unity by transferring
some political rights to the former separatists. Meanwhile, economic
power-sharing seems to be a pre-emptive strategy to curb secessionists
since the beginning. Compared with the political ones, the economy
can be a pragmatic policy to give local insurgents money to put down
their arms.
These typologies ultimately need long-term commitment between
government and separatists to maintain joint stability. Nevertheless,
most importantly, both actors should hold on to their egoistic attitudes
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for the long peace condition. This prerequisite, consequently, always
requires improved power-sharing policies that might keep commitments
between the government and former separatists.
CONCLUSION

Power-sharing is a solution to resolve ethnic conflict in some multiethnic countries. Based on my findings, political-power sharing and territorial power-sharing are the best solutions to solve high ethnic conflict
escalation. Proportional and consensus democracy are also the most
preferred model. At the same time, these two approaches are arguably
successful and failed in some countries. This argument depends on
the specific in-country case.
The study shows that power-sharing policies can be divided into
three phases like post-conflict, in-conflict, and pre-conflict. These
three phases enable the government to have various power-sharing
policies to deal with the separatists. First, economic power-sharing
can be preventive to curb the greater possibility of insurgencies at the
subnational level. This emphasizes mutually balanced public fund
transfer and incentives from the central to provincial governments. It
also requires wide access for locals to utilize their local resources and
national interests. Political power-sharing can be the last and strongest
power-sharing to curb secessionism by acknowledging the separatists as
the leading local political figures. It can be public office appointments
and territorial reform that might give autonomous status within the
national system. More importantly, this scheme allows the government
to keep the separatist under the radar.
From the country level, European and Asian countries show the
power-sharing policies because of the committed peace agreement and
consistent power-sharing implementation since the beginning. However,
weak state capacity has been the major reason why power-sharing fails,
particularly in the African cases. The limitation of this research is the
outdated dataset, which implies a lack of the current power-sharing
policies. If further analyzed using a more current dataset, the results
could be similar with these research findings or perhaps different due
https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/politik/vol7/iss2/16

22

Jati: Power-Sharing as The Key of Secessionist Conflict Resolution in D
POWER-SHARING AS THE KEY OF SECESSIONIST CONFLICT RESOLUTION

299

to changed context. This is an interesting topic that needs to be further
researched.
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